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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Testing the case by this analysis, may the Regents impose health regulations, and
is the X-Ray requirement reasonable? The protection of students from contagious diseases while attending the University is of primary importance, and when dealing with
an insidious disease such as tuberculosis the Regents, having "full control of the university," should have ample authority to protect students from possible exposure.
Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 138 Pac. 937 (1913) (vaccination). A blanket
requirement of an X-Ray examination seems an effective and reasonable method of
discovering infected persons, so that they may be prevented from exposing other students to the disease. The dissenting opinion argues that the potential exemption of two
hundred students per year on religious grounds would not present a very serious
problem, because present incidence of undiscovered tuberculosis at the University indicates that this exemption, if granted, would result in only one undiscovered case every
seven and one-half years being concealed within the ranks of the religiously exempt.
While the argument is appealing at first blush, it overlooks the fact that one of the
most probable reasons for the falling incidence of tuberculosis at the University is that
all students are examined, and that to exempt some students would tend to increase
the chances that students would be exposed to the disease. Thus if the requirement is a
reasonable one, the Court's decision in the instant case was correct, although based on
an unnecessary application of the "clear and present danger" test.
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Statute of Frauds-Real Estate Brokers' Contracts-Agency. P orally engaged D to
sell P's land, for which D was to receive a commission of $1,000. D falsely represented that he had procured a purchaser who would buy the property if he could
obtain a loan of $10,000, and that D could procure the necessary loan upon paying a
bonus of $3,000 to the lender. P, in reliance on these representations, entered a written
agreement to pay D $4,000. P brought an action to recover the $3,000 which D had
received and converted to his own use. Held: The oral agreement created an agency
relationship which D breached by his misrepresentations, and RCW 19.36.010 (5)
[RRS § 5825(5)], which provides that "An agreement authorizing or employing an
agent or broker to sell or purchase real estate for compensation or commission" shall
be void unless in writing, is not applicable since it refers only to agreements for the
payment of a commission, and does not require that the actual authority to sell or
purchase be in writing. Mele v. Cerenzie, 140 Wash. Dec. 115, 241 P. 2d 669 (1952).
There is ample authority in Washington for the proposition that the agency to
sell or purchase on the one hand, and an agreement to pay a real estate broker's commission on the other, are separate and distinct, and that it is only the latter which is
required by the statute to be in writing. Stewart v. Preston, 77 Wash. 559, 137 Pac.
993 (1914); Ewing and Clark v. Mionford, 157 Wash. 617, 289 Pac. 1026 (1930);
Pederson v. Jones, 35 Wn. 2d 180, 211 P. 2d 705 (1949). In the Pederson case,
the broker, employed to purchase land for his principal, bought the land himself
at a lower price, and then resold it to the principal at a profit. The court held that
the broker could not avoid liability for his fraud by the plea that his agency was not in
writing. However, in an earlier Washington case, the orally employed broker had
purchased land in his own name with his own funds and later had sold it to a third
party at a profit, and the court held that no constructive trust could be placed upon the
proceeds of the sale in the broker's hands, on the basis, in part, that under RCW
19.36.010 (5) [RRS § 5825(5)], an agreement employing an agent or broker to sell
or purchase real estate for compensation is void unless in writing. Therefore, the relationship of principal and agent did not exist. Carkonen v. Alberts, 196 Wash. 575, 83
P. 2d 900 (1938). In a comment on the case in 14 WAsH. L. REV. 210 (1939), the
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author concluded that the court was bringing the situation within the operation of that
part of the statute of frauds (represented in Washington by RCW 64.04.010, [RRS
§ 10550]) which requires every conveyance of real estate or of an interest therein to
be by deed, and that in reaching the result by this avenue the court was supported by
precedent in many jurisdictions. If this was the view of the court, the Carkonen case
appears to be inconsistent with the Pederson case which held that RCW 19.36.010
[RRS §5825] was controlling in this type of case. In the Mele case the Pederson case
was cited for this position, and the interpretation given that statute was quite different
from that given it in the Carkonen opinion. In the latter case the court mentioned
certain prior Washington cases, stating that the "fraud perpetrated by the agent in
those cases distinguishes them from the present case." If there can be a distinction
between the Carkonen decision and the two recent cases, the quoted portion from that
opinion is the apparent answer. It seems questionable, however, whether this is a valid
distinction, when the ultimate question for decision is whether an agency relationship
was created by virtue of the oral agreement.
Although the Carkonen case may possibly stand alone on its facts, the reasoning
of the Mele and Pederson cases appears inconsistent and seems preferable. The fact
that fraud is not present may be a means of reaching the result that no constructive
trust could arise, but it does not seem a valid reason for a different interpretation of
RCW 19.36.010 [RRS § 5825]. The literal interpretation of that statute in the Carkonen case might easily further the perpetration of fraud upon an innocent landowner
or prospective purchaser. The court quoted with approval in the Mele case a passage
from Rathbun v. McLay, 76 Conn. 308, 56 A. 511 (1903), which sums up this line of
reasoning adequately: "To adopt the defendant's contention would be to hold the
monstrous doctrine that an agent employed to do anything concerning land could with
impunity be as dishonest as he pleases, and cheat and defraud his principal to his
heart's content, if it chanced that his agency was not evidenced in writing." It is to be
hoped that in the future the Washington court will adhere to the principles advanced
in the Pederson and Mele cases.
JAMES B. MITCHELL
Statute of Frauds-Sufficiency of Memorandum. Action on a contract whereby P
agreed to sell and D to buy 4200 day-old poults. Such a contract is unenforceable
unless a memorandum signed by D is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
statute of frauds. RCW 63.04.050 (1) [RRS § 5836-4(1)]. P relied on a printed contract form, filled in by P but unsigned by either party, and a postal card signed by D
on which D wrote, "Dear Mr. Grant: I have decided to not raise any turkeys this
year so will you please cancel my order? . . ." P contended that the word "order"
incorporated by reference the terms of the form filled in by P. Judgment for P. On
appeal, Held: Reversed. Grant v. Anvil, 39 Wn. 2d 722, 238 P. 2d 393 (1951).
The decision turns on the construction of the reference in the postal card to the
"order." The Court cited RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 208, Illus. 9 where a distinction
is drawn between a written memorandum of an agreement and the intangible agreement which is evidenced by the memorandum. According to the RESTATEMENT, a
letter referring to the "agreement between us" would constitute a sufficient memorandum if the reference is to the writing, but not if the reference is to the intangible
agreement. Whether the reference is to the writing or to the intangible agreement is
a question of interpretation. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, supra. Here, the Court said
there was nothing to indicate that the postal card referred to an extrinsic writing.
When the seller has filled out a printed contract form, unsigned by the buyer, and
the buyer later writes to the seller making reference to the "order" and acknowledges

